Philosophical arguments
A.A. 2025/2026
Obiettivi formativi
Students will gain in-depth knowledge and expertise in an ongoing debate in recent philosophical research.
Risultati apprendimento attesi
Students will acquire the ability to:
- critically analyse arguments in different research fields, formulate new arguments to defend (or reject) specific philosophical claims, construct mental experiments and assess mental experiments already present in the literature;
- discuss and compare different philosophical positions;
- reflect on complex and articulated philosophical arguments, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses;
- take their own position in a philosophical debate and to put forward arguments in support of it;
- communicate the results of their research effectively, also using multimedia techniques to represent information with possible applications in teaching;
- use relational, communicative and organisational skills also in highly complex contexts and in the management of group work;
- transmit the skills obtained also in non-specialist contexts;
- reflect on their own skills and evaluations;
- autonomously research the philosophical sources of a debate or a school of thought;
- independently investigate a philosophical position or theoretical thesis.
- critically analyse arguments in different research fields, formulate new arguments to defend (or reject) specific philosophical claims, construct mental experiments and assess mental experiments already present in the literature;
- discuss and compare different philosophical positions;
- reflect on complex and articulated philosophical arguments, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses;
- take their own position in a philosophical debate and to put forward arguments in support of it;
- communicate the results of their research effectively, also using multimedia techniques to represent information with possible applications in teaching;
- use relational, communicative and organisational skills also in highly complex contexts and in the management of group work;
- transmit the skills obtained also in non-specialist contexts;
- reflect on their own skills and evaluations;
- autonomously research the philosophical sources of a debate or a school of thought;
- independently investigate a philosophical position or theoretical thesis.
Periodo: Secondo semestre
Modalità di valutazione: Esame
Giudizio di valutazione: voto verbalizzato in trentesimi
Corso singolo
Questo insegnamento può essere seguito come corso singolo.
Programma e organizzazione didattica
Edizione unica
Responsabile
Periodo
Secondo semestre
Programma
The course aims to equip students with the conceptual tools needed to engage critically with contemporary debates in action theory. It offers a systematic exploration of fundamental questions about human agency such as: What does it mean to act? How do intentions relate to what we do? How can actions be explained, and in what sense can they be evaluated morally?
We begin with the basic question of what constitutes an action, distinguishing actions from mere bodily movements or passive events. Drawing on the foundational texts of Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe, we examine the criteria by which something counts as an action, and whether agency requires consciousness, voluntariness, or rationality.
We address the central role of intention in distinguishing actions from accidents. We consider various accounts of intention—intention-in-action and future-directed intention—and explore how intention structures explanation of action. We address the question of how actions are explained, contrasting reasons-explanations with purely causal or mechanistic accounts.. We also investigate the nature of practical reasoning and the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of motivation. In the final segment of the course, we shift from descriptive to normative questions and consider the moral evaluation of actions. What is the relationship between an agent's intentions and the moral permissibility or blameworthiness of their actions? Can an action be wrong even if done for the right reasons, or vice versa? This part of the course will engage with debates about the moral significance of intention, the doctrine of double effect, and distinctions between doing and allowing, intending and foreseeing, and acting and omitting.
We begin with the basic question of what constitutes an action, distinguishing actions from mere bodily movements or passive events. Drawing on the foundational texts of Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe, we examine the criteria by which something counts as an action, and whether agency requires consciousness, voluntariness, or rationality.
We address the central role of intention in distinguishing actions from accidents. We consider various accounts of intention—intention-in-action and future-directed intention—and explore how intention structures explanation of action. We address the question of how actions are explained, contrasting reasons-explanations with purely causal or mechanistic accounts.. We also investigate the nature of practical reasoning and the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of motivation. In the final segment of the course, we shift from descriptive to normative questions and consider the moral evaluation of actions. What is the relationship between an agent's intentions and the moral permissibility or blameworthiness of their actions? Can an action be wrong even if done for the right reasons, or vice versa? This part of the course will engage with debates about the moral significance of intention, the doctrine of double effect, and distinctions between doing and allowing, intending and foreseeing, and acting and omitting.
Prerequisiti
No requirements
Metodi didattici
Lectures and student presentations
Materiale di riferimento
Final Bibliography
6 CFU
1. Paul, S. (2021), The Philosophy of Action. A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge 2021.
2. Danto, A.C. (1965), "Basic Actions", American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (2), 141-148
3. Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; 2nd edition, 1963; reprinted, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
4. Davidson, D. (1963), "Actions, Reasons and Causes", The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (23), 685-700, repr. in Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Frankfurt, H. (1978). The Problem of Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157-162.
In addition, the following suggested reading: Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. and Tenenbaum, Sergio, "Action", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL =
9 CFU
In addition to 1-5:
1. Davidson D. "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?", In Moral Concepts, ed. by Joel Feinberg, 93-113. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, 1980.
2. Ferrero F. (2017), "Intending, Acting, and Doing," Philosophical Explorations, 20 (sup. 2): 13-39
3. Davis W. (1984), ' "A Causal Theory of Intending", American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (1):43-54.
4. J. David Velleman (2007), "What Good is a Will?", In Leist, Anton, Action in Context, pp. 193-215: De Gruyter.
5. Bratman, M. E: (1984): "Two Faces of Intention, Philosophical Review, 93 (3): 375-405.
6. Warren Quinn (1989), "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect," Philosophy & Public Affairs 18.
7. Thomson, J. J. "Self-defense" (1991), Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 283-310.
8. Scheffler, S. (2004), "Doing and Allowing", Ethics, 114, No. 2, pp. 215-239.
9. Scanlon, T. M. (2008). "Intentions and Permissibility." In Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press.
6 CFU
1. Paul, S. (2021), The Philosophy of Action. A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge 2021.
2. Danto, A.C. (1965), "Basic Actions", American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (2), 141-148
3. Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; 2nd edition, 1963; reprinted, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
4. Davidson, D. (1963), "Actions, Reasons and Causes", The Journal of Philosophy, 60 (23), 685-700, repr. in Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Frankfurt, H. (1978). The Problem of Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157-162.
In addition, the following suggested reading: Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. and Tenenbaum, Sergio, "Action", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL =
9 CFU
In addition to 1-5:
1. Davidson D. "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?", In Moral Concepts, ed. by Joel Feinberg, 93-113. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, 1980.
2. Ferrero F. (2017), "Intending, Acting, and Doing," Philosophical Explorations, 20 (sup. 2): 13-39
3. Davis W. (1984), ' "A Causal Theory of Intending", American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (1):43-54.
4. J. David Velleman (2007), "What Good is a Will?", In Leist, Anton, Action in Context, pp. 193-215: De Gruyter.
5. Bratman, M. E: (1984): "Two Faces of Intention, Philosophical Review, 93 (3): 375-405.
6. Warren Quinn (1989), "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect," Philosophy & Public Affairs 18.
7. Thomson, J. J. "Self-defense" (1991), Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 283-310.
8. Scheffler, S. (2004), "Doing and Allowing", Ethics, 114, No. 2, pp. 215-239.
9. Scanlon, T. M. (2008). "Intentions and Permissibility." In Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press.
Modalità di verifica dell’apprendimento e criteri di valutazione
Oral exam for not attending students
Class presentation, oral exam and final paper for attending students
Attending students are those students who attend 40 hours of class (for 9 CFU) and 30 hours of class (for 6 CFU)
Class presentation, oral exam and final paper for attending students
Attending students are those students who attend 40 hours of class (for 9 CFU) and 30 hours of class (for 6 CFU)
Moduli o unità didattiche
Parte A e B
M-FIL/05 - FILOSOFIA E TEORIA DEI LINGUAGGI - CFU: 6
Lezioni: 40 ore
Parte C
M-FIL/05 - FILOSOFIA E TEORIA DEI LINGUAGGI - CFU: 3
Lezioni: 20 ore
Siti didattici
Docente/i
Ricevimento:
mercoledì 13-16.
Festa del Perdono, 7 - Cortile Ghiacciaia, II piano. Per favore mandatemi una mail per fissare l'appuntamento.