Game Theory
A.Y. 2022/2023
Learning objectives
The aim of this course is to equip students with the tools required to understand game theory and its traditional solution concepts.
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interactions.
The course will cover normal form and extensive form games, games of perfect, imperfect and incomplete information, and will present equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and sequential equilibrium.
We will also discuss a variety of examples including classic games and some economic applications.
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interactions.
The course will cover normal form and extensive form games, games of perfect, imperfect and incomplete information, and will present equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and sequential equilibrium.
We will also discuss a variety of examples including classic games and some economic applications.
Expected learning outcomes
By the end of the course students will be able to model situations of economic and social interaction as games, discuss and predict the behavior of players according to different solution concepts, understand the benefits and limitations of those concepts, model incomplete information in games, and critically comprehend existing economic models.
Lesson period: First trimester
Assessment methods: Esame
Assessment result: voto verbalizzato in trentesimi
Single course
This course cannot be attended as a single course. Please check our list of single courses to find the ones available for enrolment.
Course syllabus and organization
Single session
Responsible
Lesson period
First trimester
Course syllabus
Normal form games:
· Nash equilibrium
· Dominance
· Perfect equilibrium
· Incomplete information
Extensive form games:
· Backward induction
· Subgame perfection
· Weak perfect bayesian equilibrium
· Sequential equilibrium
Examples and economic applications
· Nash equilibrium
· Dominance
· Perfect equilibrium
· Incomplete information
Extensive form games:
· Backward induction
· Subgame perfection
· Weak perfect bayesian equilibrium
· Sequential equilibrium
Examples and economic applications
Prerequisites for admission
There is no formal requirement. Students must be comfortable with mathematical thinking and rigorous arguments.
Teaching methods
Frontal lectures.
Teaching Resources
Recommended readings:
A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. Chapters 7, 8, 9.
E. van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Chapters 1, 2, 6.
A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. Chapters 7, 8, 9.
E. van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Chapters 1, 2, 6.
Assessment methods and Criteria
The final assessment is based on a written exam at the end of the course, which will focus on material presented and discussed in lectures.
Students can gain extra points through active participation during lectures.
Students can gain extra points through active participation during lectures.
Educational website(s)
Professor(s)
Reception:
Wednesday 9:00-12:00 or by appointment (please confirm via email)
MS Teams