UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO

AL MAGNIFICO RETTORE
DELL'UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO   COD. ID: 4235

Il sottoscritto chiede di essere ammesso a partecipare alla selezione pubblica, per titoli ed esami, per il conferimento di un assegno di ricerca presso il Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi Quantitativi, responsabile scientifico la **Prof.ssa Veronica Grembi**

Andrea Cintolesi
CURRICULUM VITAE

INFORMAZIONI PERSONALI

Cognome	Cintolesi
Nome	Andrea
Data Di Nascita	23/10/1988

OCCUPAZIONE ATTUALE

PhD Student	European University Institute

ISTRUZIONE E FORMAZIONE

Titolo	Corso di studi	Università	anno conseguimento titolo
Laurea Magistrale o equivalente	Scienze Economiche	Università di Pisa – Scuola Sant'Anna	2012
Specializzazione			
Dottorato Di Ricerca	In corso	European University Insitute	Pending – Ottobre 2019
Master	In Economic Analysis	Universidad Carlos III	2014
Diploma Di Specializzazione Medica			
Diploma Di Specializzazione Europea			
Altro			

SUPPORTO ALLA RICERCA

Research Assistant for Prof. Ichino - EUI (2015)
Research Assistant for Prof. Mattozzi – EUI (2016)
Research Assistant for Prof. Abraham - EUI (2017)

LINGUE STRANIERE CONOSCIUTE

lingue	livello di conoscenza
Spagnolo	Fluente
Inglese	Fluente

PREMI, RICONOSCIMENTI E BORSE DI STUDIO

anno	Descrizione premio
2008-2010	Percorso di Eccellenza – Università di Pisa
2012-2013	Percorso di Eccellenza – Università di Pisa

Working Papers

"Keep Fr-iends Close, but Enemies Closer": Connections And Political Career (2019)

| Using newly collected data on ties among local politicians in Italy since 1985, this paper studies the relation between cross party connections and future career prospects. Exploiting a difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that ruling coalition members connected to the runner-up are twice as likely to be promoted to the council where the runner-up leads the opposition. The results are driven by weak and ideologically fragmented governments. Interestingly, the effect of connections with the leader of the rivals disappears when I consider appointments to boards of state-owned enterprises. These findings suggest that connected politicians act as political brokers and smooth the relationship between government and opposition. In addition, a political connection enhances the likelihood of holding a higher political office later on. Finally, connected politicians are less educated than the average appointed official, indicating that political selection is negatively affected.

The Good Old Spendthrift: The Fiscal Effects Of Political Tenure (JOINT WITH D. IORIO AND A. MATTOZZI 2018)

We construct a novel measure of political capital using a novel dataset from 62 old and new democracies (1972-2014): the tenure accumulated over the past legislatures by the parties in government. Our measure uncovers a large variation in the political capital of the governments alternating in office. We show that, at the median, five additional years of tenure increase government expenditure by 0.4 of one percent of GDP. Further, we document the absence of political budget cycles. We rule out a corruption hypothesis, and we interpret the results in the light of a theoretical model in which political tenure leads to an incumbency advantage, inducing the voters to grant a "license to spend" to the governing party.

Occupational Licensing and Nepotism (JOINT WITH O. BAMIEH 2017)

We explore whether the decentralization of hiring committees reduces nepotism. We exploit a change in the rules for grading entry examinations of the Italian bar exam, which was first graded locally and then randomly assigned to a different district. We proxy for nepotism using the share of people passing the bar exam who share their family name with a lawyer already present in the official register in each separate district. Our results show that when exams are shipped to be graded by a different district the share of relatives that passes the exams drops of 33%. In particular, only relatives of senior lawyers benefit from the presence of a member of the family in the register when exams are graded locally, while relatives of junior lawyers do not enjoy any better chance.

Primary Elections and Politicians' Ideologies 2017

I identify the causal effects of the introduction of primary elections on the elected politicians' ideologies. I exploit data on US Senators elected in New York State and on Italian municipalities. The two datasets differ in time and level of elections and in the type of primaries (open or close). In both datasets I find that primaries don't change the average ideology of the elected politician, but decrease its volatility. The impact on the volatility is very large in both samples and accounts for an overall reduction of more than the 50%. I argue that without primaries, party factions coordinate and split candidates across districts over their most preferred platforms, while with primaries the average party ideology is always selected.

ALTRE INFORMAZIONI

Programming Skills: Anaconda, EViews, NetworkX, Python, Spyder, STATA, R, ZTree

Le dichiarazioni rese nel presente curriculum sono da ritenersi rilasciate ai sensi degli artt. 46 e 47 del DPR n. 445/2000.

Il presente curriculum, non contiene dati sensibili e dati giudiziari di cui all'art. 4, comma 1, lettere d) ed e) del D.Lgs. 30.6.2003 n. 196.

Luogo e data: Firenze, 05/05/2019

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