



TO MAGNIFICO RETTORE OF UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO

ID CODE 5988 _____

I the undersigned asks to participate in the public selection, for qualifications and examinations, for the awarding of a type B fellowship at **Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università Degli Studi di Milano** _____

Scientist- in - charge: **Prof. Francesco Guala** _____

[Name and surname]

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname	Leffler
Name	Karl Olof

PRESENT OCCUPATION

Appointment	Structure
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Pavia	100% employment, conducting research on reasons for action with a project called 'Bad Reasons'.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Degree	Course of studies	University	year of achievement of the degree
Degree	BA in Practical philosophy, BSc in Political science (secondary specialization: economics)	University of Gothenburg (both)	2012 (both), pass w. distinction (both)
Specialization			
PhD	Philosophy	University of Leeds	2019, pass w/o corrections
Master	Practical philosophy	University of Gothenburg	2014, pass w. distinction
Degree of medical specialization			
Degree of European specialization			
Other			



REGISTRATION IN PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Date registration	of	Association	City
05/2018		Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy	York

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Languages		level of knowledge
Swedish		Native
English		Fluent
Danish, German	Norwegian,	Reasonable
French		Basic

AWARDS, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, SCHOLARSHIPS

Year	Description of award
2015	Leeds University 110th Anniversary Scholarship: Covered fees and maintenance during my PhD.

TRAINING OR RESEARCH ACTIVITY

I am currently a postdoc at the University of Pavia. Before arriving at Pavia, I was a postdoc at Vienna and taught at Gothenburg and Durham after my PhD at Leeds in 2019. And before that, I studied philosophy and politics, economics, and the psychology of decision-making at Gothenburg in my native Sweden. But I am now delighted to apply for the advertised postdoc in the project ‘Normative Kinds’ at Milan (ref. nr: 5988).

My AOS:s are metaethics, normative ethics, and philosophy of action, and my AOC:s are social and political philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of social science. Accordingly, my research profile lies at the intersection of metanormativity and social ontology, where my work also long has had an eye to the philosophy of social science, both methodologically (Leffler, 2022; Leffler 2023b) and normatively (Leffler, forthcoming.b).

More concretely, my research has two main strands. First, I develop a Humean constitutivist picture of individual agency, including norms of reasons, rationality, and morality. Second, I write about interrelations between individual and corporate agency, arguing that tensions between the two suggest problems for realist holism about corporate agency. Putting the strands together, my publication record has become rather extensive and begun to generate an international reputation for my work (Leffler, 2016a; 2019; 2020; 2022; 2023a-e; forthcoming.a-b). This is also evidenced by the increasing number of invitations to conferences and volumes I have started to receive recently.

My research plan for Milan brings the two strands of my research together, asking (meta)normative questions about things like reasons, welfare, and the constitution of agency. While these topics are far from new, they address a major lacuna in the social ontological literature - and *ipso facto* connect to the ‘Normative Kinds’ research project. By arguing from hypotheses about reasons and welfare, often based on normative argument, to a certain approach to the social kind ‘corporate agency’, it vindicates the assumption that values are eliminable in our explanation of the social world.

In line with my previous work on individual and corporate agency (Leffler, 2016a; 2022; 2023a; 2023c-d; forthcoming.a; ms.b-f), my working hypothesis is that the correct answers will support a *dual* constitutivist view. It consists of realist Humean constitutivism about individual agency, where agents are constituted



by mental states and dispositions of structural rationality, but anti-realist constitutivism about corporate agency, where corporate agents are constituted by socially constructed rules which coordinate individual agents' actions. On both sides, agency is quite literally a normative kind, but we can say so without taking agents to have *bona fide* mental states. My aim at Milan is to write a series of articles which, together with prior work, lead up towards a monograph defending my main hypothesis. Due to the close relation it has to the starting assumptions of the 'Normative Kinds' project, the project would be an excellent environment to do so.

NB. Please also see the attached cover letter and research plan documents for more detailed outlines of the above.

PROJECT ACTIVITY

Year	Project
2023-	Conducting research on reasons for action with my project 'Bad Reasons', University of Pavia.
2022-23	Conducted research on social ontology in the project 'The Moral and Normative Foundations of Group Agency', University of Vienna.
2015-19	Writing of PhD dissertation: 'The Constitution of Constitutivism', University of Leeds.

PATENTS

Patent
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CONGRESSES AND SEMINARS

Date	Title	Place
23-24/5 2024	"Intelligibly Bad Actions", at Institutions, Agency, and Responsibility (Cork). [Invited, not yet presented.]	University College Cork
15/12 2023	"'Now What?' in Social Ontology and Metaethics", at Error Theory Workshop (Leiden), [Invited, not yet presented.]	University of Leiden
17/8 2023	"Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States", at SOCI 2023 (Stockholm).	Stockholm University
26/4; 2/6; 22/8 2023	"Kantian Doubts about Categorical Imperatives", at Third Groningen Metaethics Workshop (Groningen); Possibilities, Impossibilities, and Conflict in Ethics (Pardubice), ECAP11 (CEU/Vienna).	University of Groningen; University of Pardubice; CEU/University of Vienna
23/8; 9/9 2022	"Agent-Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Collective Action", at SOCI 2022 (Vienna); Workshop on Capacities and the Good (FU Berlin).	University of Vienna; FU Berlin
30/3; 11/6; 2/7 2022	"Deference Incorporated", at Practical Philosophy and Political Theory Research Seminar (Gothenburg); Filosofidagarna 2022 ("Swedish Congress of Philosophy 2022") (Lund); Lund University, SAP (Edinburgh)	University of Gothenburg; Lund University; University of Edinburgh



12/8; 8/9 2021; 28/1 2022	“Contingency, Sociality, and Moral Progress”, at RoME XIV (Colorado Boulder); MANCEPT: Moral and Socio-Political Progress (Manchester); The Enemy of the Good. Towards a Theory of Moral Progress Reading Group (Utrecht).	University of Colorado Boulder; University of Manchester; Utrecht University
25/9 2020	“A Reason to Know”, at The Unity of Normativity (Vienna).	University of Vienna
10/7 2020	“Weird Reasons”, at the Joint Session (Kent).	University of Kent
31/5 2019	“Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Institutions”, at Social Ontology, Normativity and Philosophy of Law (Glasgow).	University of Glasgow
30/6; 18/7; 10/11 2018	“Instrumental Rationality and the Argument against Particularistic Willing”, at Future of Normativity (Kent); Understanding Value VII (Sheffield), Irish Philosophical Society Annual Conference (UCD).	University of Kent; University of Sheffield; University College Dublin
24/8 2017; 29/7 2018	“The Virtues of the Humean Theory of Motivation”, at ECAP9 (LMU Munich); Humeanisms (Hungarian Academy of Sciences).	LMU Munich; Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Institute of Philosophy)
18/5 2017	“New Schmagency Worries”, at Thomas Schmidt’s Colloquium, HU Berlin.	HU Berlin
13/6 2015	“Categorical Normativity and Bottom-Up Solutions”, at Filosofidagarna 2015 (“Swedish Congress of Philosophy 2015”) (Linköping).	Linköping University

PUBLICATIONS

Books
Leffler, Olof & Moen, Lars (forthcoming). “Group Agency”, special issue of <i>Inquiry</i> . [Full details TBC.]

Articles in reviews
Leffler, Olof (forthcoming.a). “Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries”, in <i>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</i> : University of Southern California. [Full details TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (forthcoming.b). “Market Failures and Moral Failures: A Dilemma”, in <i>Public Affairs Quarterly</i> : University of Illinois Press. [Full details TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (2023a). “Agent-Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Corporate Agency”, in <i>Analytic Philosophy</i> : Wiley. [Published Online First 2023, full details TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (2023b). “Contingency, Sociality, and Moral Progress”, in <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i> : Cambridge University Press. [Published Online First 2023, full details TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (2023c). “Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States”, in <i>Inquiry</i> (Leffler, O. & Moen, L. eds. special issue): Taylor & Francis. [Published Online First 2023, full details TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (2023d). “Zombies Incorporated”, in <i>Theoria</i> : Wiley. [Published Online First 2023, full details TBC.]



TBC.]
Leffler, Olof (2023e). "A Reason to Know", in <i>Journal of Value Inquiry</i> : Springer. Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 557-575. [Originally published Online First 2021.]
Leffler, Olof (2022). "How Simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?", in <i>Philosophical Explorations</i> : Taylor & Francis. Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 125-140.
Leffler, Olof (2019). "New Shmagency Worries", in <i>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</i> : University of Southern California. Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 121-145.
Leffler, Olof (2018). "Recension av Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World - Beyond Tolerance (Ryan Muldoon)" ("Review of Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World - Beyond Tolerance (Ryan Muldoon)"), in <i>Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi: Thales</i> . Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 46-51. [NB. In Swedish, not attached.]
Leffler, Olof (2016a). "The Foundations of Agency - and Ethics?", in <i>Philosophia</i> : Springer. Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 547-563.
Leffler, Olof (2016b). "Recension av From Morality to the End of Reason (Ingmar Persson)" ("Review of From Morality to the End of Reason (Ingmar Persson)"), in <i>Filosofisk Tidskrift: Thales</i> . Vol. 2016, No. 1, pp. 60-65. [NB. In Swedish, not attached.]
Leffler, Olof (2014). "Om rättfärdigandereflektion" ("On Justification by Reflection"), in Alarcon, Meri; Amundsen Bergström, Matilda; Kaveh, Tanja & Pettersen, Andrea Vilde (eds.). <i>Meningens motstånd</i> , Göteborgs universitet: Institutionen för litteratur, idéhistoria och religion, SWE, pp. 35-39. [NB. In Swedish, not attached.]

Congress proceedings
Leffler, Olof (2020). "Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law", in Garcia-Godinez, Miguel; Mellin, Rachael & Tuomela, Raimo (eds.). <i>Social Ontology, Normativity and Law</i> , De Gruyter, GER: Berlin, pp. 115-132.

OTHER INFORMATION

See attached CV, cover letter, and research plan for fuller descriptions of my past activities and intentions with the current position.
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Declarations given in the present curriculum must be considered released according to art. 46 and 47 of DPR n. 445/2000.

The present curriculum does not contain confidential and legal information according to art. 4, paragraph 1, points d) and e) of D.Lgs. 30.06.2003 n. 196.

Please note that CV WILL BE PUBLISHED on the University website and It is recommended that personal and sensitive data should not be included. This template is realized to satisfy the need of publication without personal and sensitive data.

Please DO NOT SIGN this form.

Place and date: __Pavia_____, __23/11 2023_____